The important thing is to establish a political climate of opinion which will make it politically profitable for the wrong people to do the right thing."

AND IN TO LINE WE THAT AND THE

Milton Friedman

Bitcoin Hivemind

TAB Conf, Atlanta, GA

Paul Sztorc

1/27/2018

BitcoinHivemind.com


@BitcoinHivemind

Version 1.1 2/13/2018

Overview

- This talk is about the problem which Hivemind solves,
- it is **not** about *how Hivemind works* .
- www.BitcoinHivemind.com

 Hivemind is about "Governance", defined as group decisionmaking.




- **Governance** has problems namely <u>rational ignorance</u> and <u>preference aggregation</u>, and these problems can be solved with <u>conditional prediction markets</u>.
- This is a passion project of mine, I hope you enjoy!

Agenda

- 1. Moral Objections to Governance (Speech)
- 2. How Society Reacts to Problems (An Analogy)
- 3. Why Governance is Hard (A Diagnosis)
- 4. What Prediction Markets Are (An Institution)
- 5. Blockchain <u>Conditional Prediction Markets</u> Solution to Governance
- 6. Getting Practical

Moral Objection to Governance



 Observation: Undesirable to have a decision forced on you. (Might be one you dislike.)

\extreme

"all contracts are coercive", naïve anarchy

Policy: Individual should <u>always</u> have a pure veto (even on pre-agreed rules); or rather: consent can/should <u>never</u> be estimated.

- I don't agree with the Policy:
 - 1. Efficient cooperation \rightarrow better life
 - 2. Ad hominem fallacy
 - 3. "consent of the governed"

1 – Efficiency / Wasting Resources

- Some things are much easier to buy/maintain as a group. Marginal utility of "individualism" rapidly diminishes as we approach "100% individualism".
- "One Person Ruins it for Everyone" (de facto Entangled)
 - Outcome is an "OR" aggregation process, already
 - Ozone Layer / The Montreal Protocol (no competing Earths)
 - (Hypothetical) Grey Goo self replicating nanotechnology that kills us all
 - Pollution / Externalities
 - Overfishing / Species Extinction
 - Extremely 'contagious' spread of fire / disease / looting.
- Efficient "re-use" of goods/services.
 - The roads (infamous) and highways; National parks
 - Walls/Castles -- (4x vs x^2), strangers vs friends/family, trust issues
 - The Erie Canal, Louisiana Purchase, Interstate Highway System,
 - Basic science research (ie, its hard for Newton to patent "Gravity")
- Excessive market transaction costs too hard to charge "per time per individual"
 - Ronald Coase Theory of the Firm; organizations vs markets to difficult to rehire people every day for every job, costs: search, contract, negotiation etc. Long term contracts are better.
 - Roads again (excl bridges, trains);
 - Long time horizon, not enough ink

"However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of imperfect menilive Milton Friedman



L.P.D.: LIBERTARIAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

By Tom O'Donnell March 31, 2014

I was shooting heroin and reading "The

Fountainhead" in privately own came in. I put it. It was the

"Home Depot™ Presents the Police!®" I said, flashing my badge and my gun and a small picture of Ron Paul. "Nobody move unless you want to!" They didn't.

"Bad news,

"What? Is the

"Now, which one of you *punks* is going to *pay me* to investigate this crime?" No one spoke up.

"Worse. Son worth of bit

"Come on," I said. "Don't you all understand that the protection of private property is the foundation of all personal liberty?"

The heroin

It didn't seem like they did.

- Excessive ma
 - Ronald Co every day better.
- "Seriously, guys. Without a strong economic motivator, I'm just going to stand here and not solve this case. Cash is fine, but I prefer being paid in gold bullion or autographed Penn Jillette posters."
- Roads again (e.
- Long time horizon, not enough ink

"However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of imperfect meniver Milton Friedman

ividual" e people cts are

y of

2 – Ad Hominem

- All of the –isms, including Anarchism, are ad hominem fallacies.
- Karl Popper "Open society and its enemies"
 - The wrong question (Who should rule?)
 - What <u>process</u> moves us from bad policies to better ones at the cheapest cost. What is 'most profitable' process dBenefit/Cost/time. (Not "who is most trustworthy?" –error, temporary, manipulable).
- Image: people → policy → result
- The important thing is the policy, not who put it there.
- You order / spouse orders / lucky guess → grilled chicken sandwich ordered for \$10 → you eat the sandwich and pay \$10. It is fungible identical in every sense. In fact, if you give your order to the waitress, she's going to pass it on to the chef anyway.
- Obviously, if you are in control, policies will always be good for you. But remember the "Or" scenarios on the previous slide.
- Merely finding the best policies is useless. NEED a <u>Meta-Policy</u> to know how to <u>get to</u> the best policies from here, and ensure we don't go <u>backwards</u> once we get there. Without it, anarchism is as impractical pacifism.

3 – Consent of the Governed

- Voluntarism = interactions <u>should be voluntary</u>
- Declaration of Independence // Post-Enlightenment governments
 - "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"
- So, USA is 100% voluntarist ...at least <u>in intent</u>.
- AnCaps you can hire security guards (if you explicitly agree), but "taxation is theft". Need to ask, can't assume.

3 – All Knowledge is Imperfect (incl. Consent)

- Worst case -- no direct knowledge -- House MD example
- Best case still can never be 100% certain of consent
 - Are they under mysterious duress that we've failed to detect?
 - Hiring security guard = racketeering?
 - Was the consent informed? To what extent?
 - Can 'consent' be revoked at any time?
 - Misunderstandings / miscommunications?
- So, it isn't always as simple as "asking"...
 - Unable to speak / perform computation unconscious
 - No time to ask (object would prefer that we didn't wait) choking to death, imminent cataclysm
 - Ruins "the experience" Surprise party!
- ...or even as "listening".
 - Multiple selves *across time* ("I don't want to practice the piano") alarm clock, going to the gym, going to school, saving money, severe drug addiction self as group.
 - Brainwashed / preferences hacked ("I love going to church") peer pressure, too young (0-10 yrs old), outright deception.
 - Ruins "the experience" roller coaster, S&M club thrill is inability to escape.
 - (is a nation state a roller coaster, sometimes it feels like one.. sometimes it feels like an S&M club)
- My view: **consent is always conjectured** (imperfectly estimated). So the fact that we have to estimate "group consent" is not logical a deal-breaker.

The "Public" Sector

- *Fractal* nature of the "public / private" distinction:
 - "Public" refrigerator for 30th floor East of NYC Goldman Sach's building – "etiquette"
 - "public roads", "public schools" in Cleveland and Connecticut
 - Competing nation-states; states as "laboratories of democracy"
 - anarchist brain cancer.
- Only the individual experiences <u>pain</u>, <u>pleasure</u>, <u>creativity</u>, and <u>will</u>. But this says nothing about how to maximize <u>individual</u> well-being.

"There are some problems that can't be solved outside of the political arena" – Peter Thiel

Where we are

Past Slides

- Governance: group decision-making.
- **Governance = important**, some problems can only be solved with governance.
- Even on the extreme, if we <u>know</u> that "X-ism is the best", we need a tool for taking us from here to X-ism, and for keeping us at X-ism in a dynamic improving world.
- Governance can be ethical question is: does government have the consent of the governed? Can we improve tools for measuring/alerting us to consent-errors.

Coming Up

- Ignoring, Tolerating, and Solving Problems A rain metaphor
- Governance is hard. Why?
- What are prediction markets?
- What are conditional prediction markets?

Problems – Rejecting, Tolerating, and Solving

- Rejecting a Problem
 - Misunderstanding/misrecognizing the problem.
 - Ceremonial use of problem as backdrop, for social reasons.
- Tolerating a Problem
 - You know there is a problem, you know there is currently no solution. Problem may seem unsolvable.
 - Problem is accepted an unalterable fact of life.
- Solving a Problem
 - You know the problem, and the solution.
 - You will have obtained <u>more knowledge</u> and <u>better</u> <u>technology</u>, and the problem will depart, never to return.

Ex: No Rain, Bad Harvest

- Pray more [do nothing to get more rain]
 - Try to reject the problem, or erroneously respond the critical thing is prayer, not water.
 - Use false solution as opportunity for socialization (ie 'signaling' or 'loud complaining done to make friends').
 - Culture may eventually rely on these false solutions, for stability.
- Settle for Failure [accept that "rain is unreliable" is unalterably true]
 - Accept reality and make the best of it.
 - Other options: ration more; have fewer children / livestock; <u>give up</u> on agriculture (hunt instead) plant many more seeds to overcompensate for the eventual loss (work harder).
- Irrigation Technology [solve the problem]



Allen, Praying for Rain (1938)



Schulz, Peanuts (1954)

Ex: No Rain, Bad Harvest



- Irrigation Technology [solve the problem]
 - ...using more <u>knowledge</u>, and better <u>technology</u>.

Problems - Rejecting, Tolerating, and Solving

- Rejecting a Problem
 - Misunderstanding/mis

Anarchism / Voluntarism / Voting Ron Paul

- Ceremonial use of problem for social reasons.
- Tolerating a Problem
 - Recognizing that a proble currently no solution, and unsolvable.

The Cypherpunks /
Encryption / Bitcoin

- You will grit your teeth artu accept this as an unatterable fact of life -- reaching an equilibrium with the problem.
- Solving a Problem
 - Understanding the proble
 - You will have obtained mo will depart, never to retur

Blockchain Conditional ch.

Prediction Markets


Governance is Hard. Why?

- If everyone is doing the wrong thing, why can't we just get everyone to stop doing that, and do something else?
- Answer: Multi-Factor Competition
 - Costly Negotiation
 - Too many 'other things' to do
 - High cost of miscoordination

Single-Factor Competition


- You want to spend up to \$20 on dinner.
- You are choosing (and dining) alone.

Expected satisfaction by spending <=\$20 at the given restaurant



Single-Factor Competition

- You want to spend up to \$20 on dinner.
- You are choosing (and dining) alone.



- You get the highest satisfaction possible.
- Restaurants induced to compete on (satisfaction / \$).

Multi-Factor Competition

- Many people are choosing a restaurant
- You all prefer to meet at the same place.
- Harder!
 – your decision now depends on:
 - 1. What you prefer,



- 2. and <u>where other people might go</u>. Which is itself a function of:
 - 1. ...what <u>they might prefer</u>.
 - 2. ...where <u>they think other people might go.</u> Which is itself a function of:
 - 1. Everyone's collective best guess on where most people currently plan on going (ie, the <u>status quo</u>), and,



2. ... (since time/attention/communication are not free) how *open to communication / negotiation* everyone is.



 You have four criteria, but you ultimately must make one selection. Forced aggregation.

Multi-Factor Competition

- Many people are choosing a restaurant
- You all prefer to meet at the same place.

Self-fulfilling prophecy – Those who believe that "negotiating to pick a better restaurant is a lost cause", will be less open to negotiation. Circular truth.

Negotiation is especially hard when there are [1] many people, and [2] many alternatives. In USA there are ~250 Million adults, and a near-infinite number of potential policies. In these cases the prophecy is likely to self-fulfill (lost cause).

idiliction of

 Everyone's collective best guess on where most people currently plan on going (ie, the <u>status quo</u>), and,



2. ... (since time/attention/communication are not free) how *open to communication / negotiation* everyone is.



 You have four criteria, but you ultimately must make one selection. Forced aggregation.

Multi-Factor Competition

- The root cause in the restaurant example, "wanting to stay in sync with others" is a common desire.
 - Coordination reduces ambiguity / conflict.
 - Network effects / economies of scale.
- Competing w/ Facebook or Craigslist
 ...vs w/ local barber shop.





Multi-Eactor Compatition

The problem is real, and it has nothing to do with "coercion" and can't be explained with moral arguments.


Most people will put up with Facebook, even though FB is "evil". Because the alternatives are :

- [1] no Facebook (and social isolation), or
- [2] and endless (and ultimately futile) negotiation with unmotivated friends/family to switch to one particular alternative (among many). They would then need to convince their own friends, who would need to convince their own friends, and so on and so forth...

In the same way, we put up with governments, even though they are incompetent. The alternatives are:

- [1] no government and no property rights (a disaster), or
- [2] an uncertain, potentially endless, potentially violent transition period, leading to an ambiguous final outcome.

Pumping up that second factor, with a CRISIS!!



"...while these crises [Great Depression, WW2] were *transitory*, the increase in the scope of government was *permanent*."

Bad policies following crises:

1929 Crash → Taxes/tariffs, labor cartels

WW2 → Japanese Internment Camps

 $9/11/2001 \rightarrow Iraq War / PATRIOT Act$

2008 Crash → Bailouts, Retroactive Bonus Financing

Pumping up that second factor, with a CRISIS!!



Pumping up that second factor, with a CRICIC

FIGURE

This figure shows revenue of the federal government and of state and local govemments as a percentage of gross domest economy and that its


Crisis Logic

In times of crisis:

- Mis-coordination costs RISE!
- Anyone interfering with coordination is dangerous!
- Thus, the defenses of the Status Quo greatly increase.

...WIII scope

permanen.



Bac

people currently plant in going (ie, the status quo), and,

... (since time/attention/communication are not free) how open to communication / negotiation everyone is.



ive four criteria, but you ultimately must make

Voting – Your Civic Duty

- Knowledge Cost too high
 - <u>existing option</u>, the <u>challenger</u>, both <u>plans</u>, <u>likelihood</u> of follow-through, and <u>effect</u> of these plans on you.
- **Effect** is a complex topic. For some policies, only ultraspecialists know.
- 71% of Americans can't even name their Congressional Representative (Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1997)),
 - let alone the challenger or any proposed policies or voting records (or any State Senators, etc).
- Story: Lobbyists on a Plane

Voting – Multifactor-ness of "Electability"

- Arrow impossibility result: voting = paradox
 - While you have more than one voter, and a deterministic aggregation process (technicalities), you can only have one of the following two:
 - Pareto efficiency you can't hurt an option when everyone ranks it higher
 - Irrelevant alternatives really are irrelevant you can't hurt an option by re-ranking the set of options below or above it. Stalin vs Hitler.
- Arrow's result leads to strategic voting
 - If Jeb Bush had run, would have split the vote
 - When vote is split, votes cast for a 'lost cause' do not contribute at all to *The Battle* that really matters.
 - Electability knowledge that *other people* believe that this choice is not a lost cause. (Same as the restaurant example.)
 - Hence political parties / media have great influence.

To Solve Governance, We Need:

- 1. A cheap, reliable source of information on who to vote for.
- 2. A way of **crunching** the multi-factorness, specifically electability, back into a single factor.
- 3. A way of **preventing capture** of the above processes by lobbyists/cronies.

Bitcoin Hivemind

Sidechain for P2P Prediction Markets

Intrade's Conditional Prediction Markets

By Hal Finney · July 29, 2008 7:14 pm · 🗣 Comments (24) · « Prev · Next »

We have often discussed the possible benefits of prediction markets for reducing bias. One key element that could be particularly useful is a conditional prediction market, where betting claims are based on outcomes conditional on some factor we want to evaluate. Robin recently mentioned the possible benefit from <u>market claims on longevity or health conditional on various interventions</u>.

Unfortunately, there are few prediction markets in the world, and fewer conditional ones, so it is hard to know how practical this institution may become. Thanks to an initiative by OB contributor Peter McCluskey, Intrade – the large, real-money prediction market – has added conditional claims

"There are only a few people alive today worth listening to. Robin Hanson is one of them."

 Ralph Merkle, co-inventor of asymmetric (public/private) key cryptography, inventor of cryptographic hashing, and of the Merkle tree.

Agenda

- 1. Moral Objections to Governance (Speech)
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A 'prediction market' is a special kind of derivative.

Below: event derivative (InTrade.com) on 2012 global warming




Event Derivatives

	Finance Thing	Interpretation
The control of the co	Bond (Debt)	"I, Paul Sztorc, owe \$20 to whoever is holding this bond certificate on 03/02/2015."
COORDER COORDER COORDER OF THE COORD	Stock (Equity)	"I, the CEO of SztorcCorp, owe 1/100 th of SztorcCorp's profits to whoever is holding this stock certificate on 03/02/2015."
Digital Call Strike Price thisMatter.com/Money	Binary Call Option	"I, Paul Sztorc, owe \$20 to whoever is holding this Option on 03/02/2015, only if the stock price of SztorcCorp is above 40 \$/share on that date."
0 Spot Price at Expiration	(others)	(others)
The second secon	Event Derivative	"I, Paul Sztorc, owe \$20 to whoever is holding this derivative on 12/01/2016, only if Hillary Clinton is elected US President in 2016. Otherwise I owe \$0."
	(others)	www.BitcoinHivemind.com(others) 32

A Kind of "Future Wikipedia"

	Wikipedia	Truthcoin
Focus	Outcomes of past events . Consensus on known facts .	Outcomes of <i>future</i> events. <i>Future</i> consensus on <i>knowable</i> facts.
Cost	Free to read and edit .	Free to read, <u>easy to understand</u> (check prices), but edits can cost or earn you money .




Markets Aggregate Information

• For the Public: Reliable and Common Information

It's right.

It's broadcast to everyone (and everyone knows that everyone got it).

Does all of the **Research** for us, and the **Persuading**!




Benefits of PMs (Over Talking)

- Talk: Why even bother becoming informed?
 - Hard to learn this stuff (and I only have so much time)
 - How am I supposed to convince others?
 - Info-processing is difficult (why résumés must be short).
 - Minimal-info strategies (join a tribe/"political party").
- PM forces a clear definition.
- Prices are constantly and unanimously acceptable. <u>At all times</u>, <u>everyone</u> agrees with the price (if not, they can profitably trade).
- Note: Suppose climate change were false. The "reliability" and "broadcast" problems are much worse.


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Conditional Forecasts: More Than One Dimension



More Dimensions: More Forecasts, AND More **Relationships**



...they are also: "Would Y influence X?"

Example – Which CEOs aren't pulling their weight?

General Electric / CEO

John L. Flannery

Aug 1, 2017-



John L. Flannery is an American business executive. He is currently the CEO and chairman of General Electric, appointed in August 2017. Wikipedia

How do we tell?? Problem of **Agency Cost**

Two Individual Markets...


Mirroring (superfluous data)


But not for long...

Binary: Yes vs No Scaled: Min vs Max

> GE is having a rough year!


Is the CEO departing? Will he be fired? Should he be?






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Exact same data...







Four Dimensions at once, different "mirroring"


Same Data


- Deleted 2 lines (of 4).
- (Stay & Max) / Stay
- (Leave & Max) / Leave
- Scaled y-axis to \$/share.

Now: only measures GE's Stock Price










Four Dimension different "mirro

Forecasting the future stock price...

Same Data

- Deleted 2 lines (of 4).
- (Stay & Max) / Stay
- (Leave & Max) / Leave
- Scaled y-axis to \$/share.

Now: only measures GE's Stock Price



Important Questions:


- 1. Should the CEO be fired, or get a raise?
- diffe 2. Why are **both** forecasts of "the future stock price" going down?
 - 3. [extra credit] If I had instead graphed "CEO Leaves | Max " and " CEO Stays | Min ", what would those lines represent?

Same Data



- Deleted 2 lines (of 4).
- (Stay & Max) / Stay
- (Leave & Max) / Leave
- Scaled y-axis to \$/share.


Now: only measures **GE's Stock Price**



PM Governance

Applications

- "Which CEO would most increase our stock price?"
- "Which President would most decrease unemployment?"
- "Which FED Policy would most increase GDP?"
- "Which law would most decrease violent crime?"




We need



• A way of **crunching** the multi-factorness, ecifically electability, back into a single factor.

A way of **preventing capture** of the above processes by lobbyists/cronies.



"Good Economy" in 2021 (<5% Unemployment)?

40

1e

Nov 2020 Election Winner Someone Else

Democrat

Republican

Elon Musk

0.0005	0.0005
.61	.00
.38	.00
.00	.009

.9905 .0095

.61 .38

0.001

.009

Musk unlikely to win, 0.9%, "Lost Cause"

"Good Economy" in 2021 (<5% Unemployment)?

Conditional
Likelihood of
Good Economy

Nov 2020 Election Winner Someone Else

Democrat

Republican

Elon Musk

0.0005	0.0005	0.001	50%	
.61	.00	.61	0%	
.38	.00	.38	0%	
.00	.009	.009	100%	

.9905

.0095

Election hasn't **Conditional** Likelihood of happened yet... Likelihood of Winning **Good Economy** 00.1% 50% Someone Else 61.0% 0% Nov 2020 Democrat Election 38.0% 0% Republican Winner 100% 00.9% Elon Musk

And everyone knows it...

Election hasn't happened yet...

Likelihood of

Winning

Someone Else

Nov 2020

Election

Winner

Democrat

Republican

Elon Musk

00.1%

61.0%

38.0%


00.9%

of Conditional



And everyone knows it...


Voter



<u>**Especially**</u> for uninformed or angry voters – the <u>**less**</u> they know, the better. The <u>**more**</u> they are confounded by media/ads, the better!

We have returned to Single-Factor Competition!

Conditional Likelihood of Good Economy



Agenda

- 1. Moral Objections to Governance (Speech)
- How Society Reacts to Problems (An Analogy)
- 3. Why Governance is Hard (A Diagnosis)
- 4. What Prediction Markets Are (An Institution)
- 5. Blockchain <u>Conditional Prediction Markets</u> Solution to Governance
- 6. Getting Practical (2 slides)

How to convince people that the PM information is reliable and interesting?

- Ramp it up over time Popular Things Sports (SuperBowl, March Madness), Arts (Oscars, Tonys)
- Accuracy will remain high, and that people gradually become interested.
- The election process is so broken, and distasteful (ie, attack ads), that people will come around eventually.
- Keep up the pressure each election year. Aim especially for Congressional elections where impact is high, voters least informed.

The Joy Index – a talk for another time

- What do measure?
- How to measure it safely, without <u>that</u> being gamed?
 - Randomness un-gameable ("Sortition")
 - Non-attribution, secret ballots

Thank You!

Questions?